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Abstract:  
The contribution of Lotfi Zadeh to the development of fuzzy logic, goes far beyond the introduction of the seminal 
concept of a fuzzy set and has multiple facets. This article, as a small tribute to the corpus of ideas, notions and results 
brought together over almost five decades by Zadeh, singles out and illustrates two of his most stimulating, thought-
provoking and fruitful creations: fuzzy rules on the one hand, and possibility theory on the other hand. Indeed, the 
modeling of conditional statements of the form "if x is A then y is B" plays a crucial role in any attempt at formalizing 
human reasoning. Starting from the expression of different forms of fuzzy rules that have been identified in the setting 
of possibility theory, we study their counterparts in the extensions of possibilistic logic. A distinction between rules and 
meta-rules is especially emphasized, in the representational setting of possibility theory. It amounts to viewing rules as 
pieces of knowledge that contribute to the partial specification of a unique epistemic state, while meta-rules characterize 
constraints between specified epistemic states, as in possibilistic answer set programming. 
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1 General introduction 
 
Among the tremendous amount of contributions and ideas proposed and developed by Lotfi Zadeh 
over 45 years in the framework of fuzzy logic, we would like to pinpoint three very important 
pieces that have been especially influential for our own works: the notion of fuzzy rules [1], the 
new setting of possibility theory for modeling epistemic uncertainty [2], and its application to 
knowledge representation and approximate reasoning [3, 4]. After being controversial for some 
time he idea of fuzzy sets has finally been worldwide acknowledged as a simple and powerful tool 
in information modeling. It has been extremely successful in automatic control applications, where 
fuzzy rules are used as a way to easily implement interpolation mechanisms and as universal 
approximators of control laws.  
 
Zadeh has also been continuously interested in artificial intelligence (AI) along his career, and this 
interest can be traced back as early as 1950 [5]! However, Zadeh’s contribution to knowledge 
representation and approximate reasoning has remained less widely known, in spite of (or because) 
of its novelty when proposed in the late seventies. Indeed, the idea of representing pieces of 
information by means of possibility distributions, and of computing the results of inferences by the 
combination and projection of these distributions (in complete agreement with possibility theory) 
may be regarded as a breakthrough which anticipated many other works in AI ranging from 
constraint satisfaction problems to uncertainty networks. Even if Zadeh’s proposal was mainly 
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stated at the semantic level, it is sufficiently rich to include, as particular cases, possibilistic logic 
[6, 7, 8] which corresponds to the encoding of uncertain crisp propositions, as well as the extreme 
case of completely informed situations described by fuzzy propositions in a multiple-valued logic 
[9].  
 
Many of our contributions to AI, e.g. [6, 10, 11, 12, 13], have thus not just been influenced by 
Zadeh’s pioneering works, but in fact are deeply rooted in the setting of possibility theory that we 
have further developed and/or applied in new problems. Moreover, we are clearly indebted to 
Zadeh’s contributions not only for their contents, but also for providing numerous examples of non-
conventional views for approaching problems. In the following, we focus the discussions on fuzzy 
rules, a topic that may be found emblematic of Zadeh’s proposals, showing that some fresh meat 
can be still offered on this old topic, in relation with present concerns in logic programming. 
 
2 Fuzzy rules 
 
Conditional statements play a very important role in the expression of knowledge. Fuzzy 
conditional statements viewed as expressions of the form "if A then B" where A and B have fuzzy 
meanings have been considered rather early in the development of fuzzy logic. They were 
introduced in a famous seminal paper [1] by Zadeh, which is at the basis of the blossoming of fuzzy 
rule-based control and decision systems. Interestingly enough, Zadeh’s view of fuzzy rules [14, 15] 
has its roots in the idea of a fuzzy graph as a way of describing (input, output) pairs in a fuzzily 
described system [16, 17]. Such a fuzzy graph, associated with a fuzzy mapping, is made of fuzzy 
points (A, B) that can be read as a fuzzy rule "if A then B". Fuzzy points lead to the conjunctive 
view of fuzzy rules in terms of fuzzy Cartesian products A×B, put at work by Mamdani and 
Assilian [18]’s fuzzy controllers, and their numerous followers. However, it is worth noticing that 
fuzzy conditional statements in [1] are discussed in terms of a material implication linking A and B. 
But the conjunctive and implicative views are there “reconciliated” by understanding A → B 
(where A and B are defined on domains U and V respectively and + denotes a disjunction), as A×B 
+ ¬A×V, i.e. the model of the rule is on the one hand equivalent to a pair of fuzzy points, but on the 
other hand, it gives birth to the multiple-valued implication max(min(a,b), 1 − a), or to Dienes’ 
implication max(b, 1 − a)) when replacing A×B by U×B in the previous expression, which leads to 
U×B + ¬A×V (i.e., either one has B or not A) [1]. 
 
This ambiguous nature of if-then rules, whether fuzzy or not, can be related to what is often termed 
as “paradoxes of implication”, noticed for a long time. Indeed, in propositional logic, material 
implication A→B imposes joint conditions on the truth of A and B, without really conveying any 
sense of necessity or relevance [19] in the so-established link between A and B (especially when A 
is false). This has led to many theoretical developments that address this problem in different ways: 
modal logics, conditional logics, fuzzy logics, logic programming, to name only the most visible 
ones. 
 
Artificial intelligence has contributed to the emergence of the idea of a state of knowledge (or 
epistemic state) as a representation of what an agent could know about the world in given 
circumstances, see e.g. [20]. The framework of possibility theory [2] is particularly well-suited for a 
graded representation of such incomplete states of information, where it is generally useful to rank-
order the possible values of n-tuples of variables describing the state of the world according to their 
level of plausibility. Indeed, the idea of a possibility distribution as an elastic constraint restricting 
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the possible values of a variable, introduced by Zadeh [2], is a key tool for representing incomplete 
states of information and fuzzy granules of knowledge. Zadeh [21] has further investigated the idea 
of using constraints as an information representation tool. 
 
For years, researchers in possibility theory and fuzzy set theory have been interested in the proper 
modeling of if-then rules. This has led to the identification of different types of rules that involve 
the gradual nature of the properties and / or the uncertainty of the conclusions. As a result, a 
synthesis has finally emerged [22], which, within the framework of possibility theory, contrasts two 
types of modeling for rules, either at an “object” level or at a “meta level”. In this article, we 
reconsider this distinction, showing its interest and its counterpart in possibilistic logic [6, 7, 8]. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide the necessary background about possibility 
theory, highlighting the four sets of functions associated with a possibility distribution and their role 
in the specification of these distributions. Then, we discuss the modeling of if-then rules in the 
framework of possibility theory, recalling the origin of the “conjunctive” and the “implicative” 
models, and stresses the distinction between the “object” and “meta” points of view in the modeling 
of rules, which is a key issue for the understanding of the different approaches. The next section 
explains how possibilistic logic can be generalized so as to take into account the two points of view, 
and we discuss the consequences for inference. Finally, we conclude the article by showing the 
importance of the distinction between rules and meta-rules for a better understanding of possibilistic 
logic programming. 
 
3 Basics of possibility theory 
 
This section provides a short background on possibility theory, starting with the basic notion of a 
possibility distribution [2], recalling how events can be estimated on this basis by means of 
different “measures”, and discussing how a possibility distribution can be indirectly specified 
through these measures. 
 
 
3.1 Possibility distribution and associated measures 
 
Given a universe of discourse U, a possibility distribution [2] π is a function from U to [0, 1] that 
restricts the more or less possible values for a “state” whose exact value is ill-known. This state 
may be a quantity x with values in U, or the true, unique state of an incompletely described world. 
Then π(u) = 0 expresses that the value u is impossible for this ill-known quantity (or state), and u is 
all the more possible, as a value of this quantity, as π(u) is large and close to 1. 
 
Given a subset A in U, four set functions can be defined in the framework of possibility theory, 
namely ∀ A ⊆ U: 
- a (weak) possibility measure [2] :  
Π(A) = supu∈A π(u); 
it estimates the compatibility / consistency of having A true (i.e. one of the elements of A is the 
true value) with the state of knowledge represented by π; this may be seen as a measure of 
potential possibility; 
- a dual measure of (strong) necessity [23] : 
N(A) = 1 – Π(Ac) = infu∉A 1 – π(u); 
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it echoes the impossibility of the values outside A (Ac denotes the complement of A), or 
equivalently the inference of A from π and thus reflects an actual necessity; 
- a (strong) measure of possibility [24] :  
 Δ(A) = infu∈A π(u); 
it expresses to what extent all values in A have a minimal (guaranteed) level of possibility; this 
may be seen as a measure of actual possibility; 
- a dual measure of (weak) necessity [24] : 
          ∇(A) = 1 – Δ(Ac) = supu∉A 1 – π(u); 
it expresses to what extent there exists at least one impossible value outside A; as such, this is a 
measure of potential necessity. 
    
These measures are related together by the weak consistency constraint: 
 
  ∀A⊆ U, max(N(A), Δ(A)) ≤ min(Π(A), ∇(A));  
it holds if ∃ u* ∈ U π(u*) = 1 and ∃ u* ∈ U π(u*) = 0 (in other words, if the possibility distribution is 
consistent and non-trivial). 
 
3.2 Specification of a possibility distribution 
 
A possibility distribution π is often only partially specified through constraints stating upper and 
lower bounds, respectively under the form π ≤ G and F ≤ π, where F and G can be seen as the 
characteristic functions of fuzzy sets.2 Let us notice that Π and N can still be used in a non-trivial 
way when one only knows that π ≤ G (since Π and N are increasing in the broad sense with respect 
to set inclusion), while Δ and ∇ are still appropriate if it is only known that F ≤ π (indeed Δ and 
∇ are decreasing).  
 
Clearly, in case of multiple restrictions Gi we get π ≤ mini Gi, i.e. any information of this kind can 
only decrease the degrees of potential possibility, while we have maxj Fj ≤ π, which, on the contrary 
leads to an increase of the degrees of actual possibility.  
 
In the following, we only consider possibility distributions with a finite number of possibility 
degrees for the sake of simplicity: 
  a1 = 1 > a2   ... > an+1 = 0,  where n≥1. 
Moreover, these degrees are supposed to be chosen such that 1 − aj = an-j+2, which expresses that 
complementation is an internal operation on this scale. 
 
Let ai(π) = {u | π(u) ≥ ai} be the cut of level ai of π. Then, the distribution π can be decomposed 
under the form of the weighted disjunction of its n level cuts:  
 
π(u) = maxi= 1, n min(ai(π)(u), ai) 
 
as well as a weighted conjunction: 
 
π(u) = minj= 1, n max(aj(π)(u), aj+1). 
 
                                                
2 A subset and its characteristic function are denoted in the same way. 
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Thus, a possibility distribution π can be specified in terms of a finite number of level cuts, 
according to the following expressions: 
 
         ∀i = 1, n, ∀u, min(Fi(u), ai) ≤ π(u) ⇔ Δ(Fi) ≥ ai; 
∀j=1, n, ∀u, π(u) ≤ max(Gj(u), aj+1) ⇔ N(Gj) ≥ 1− aj+1. 
When the fuzzy statement "x is G" is understood as the fact that the possibility distribution πx 
representing this piece of information should satisfy the constraint πx ≤ G, choosing a particular 
distribution πx such that πx < G would be arbitrarily too precise. This leads to taking πx equal to 
the characteristic function of G. This is the minimal specificity principle [23]. Similarly, in the case 
of a constraint of the form F ≤ πx, one is led to take πx equal to F (at least if F ⊆ G), thus applying a 
maximal specificity principle. 
 
If we now consider negative statements such as "x is not F", they can be understood in two different 
ways: 
– either as "x is (not F)", i.e., πx ≤ Fc, with Fc(u) = 1 – F(u) 
– or as "x (is not) F" (that is "x is F" is not true), leading to : not(πx ≤ F) ⇔ ∃u, πx(u) > F(u). 
These two interpretations coincide only if the value of x is precisely known, i.e., if πx is equal to 1 
for a unique value (and is 0 elsewhere). 
 
4 Representations of if-then rules in possibility theory 
 
This section first recalls the conjunctive and implicative modelings of a rule [25], prior to 
distinguishing between the “object” and “meta” points of view.  
 
4.1 A first dichotomy : conjunction v.s. implication 
Let us consider a rule of the form "if x ∈ A then y ∈ B", where x and y are two quantities taking 
their values respectively on the domains U and V, where A and B are subsets of U and V. Let us 
first examine the case where A and B are ordinary subsets. 
A and B non fuzzy. The partial description offered by a rule may be understood in two different 
ways : either one insists on what is positively asserted (namely that, when x ∈  A, any value in B is 
eligible for y), or in an implicitly negative way (the values ouside B are excluded when x ∈  A): 
- (x, y) ∈  A × B is guaranteed to be possible, 
- (x, y) ∈  A × Bc is guaranteed to be impossible. 
Since nothing is said for the situations where x ∈ Ac, if π(x,y) denotes the possibility distribution 
restricting the possible values of the pair (x, y), thus we have respectively : 
- for the conjunction-based model (positive reading):  
A × B ≤ π(x,y)    (Δ1) 
which leads to the conjunctive representation: 
π*(x,y)(u,v) = 1 if (u, v) ∈  A × B, 
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      and π*(x,y)(u,v) = 0 otherwise  (since nothing is said for the other values).  
 As it may be expected we have, for all π ≥ π* :         
Δ(A × B) = 1 (Δ2) 
Since, when A(u) = 1 we have π*(x,y)(u,v) = 1 if v ∈ B, (∆1) is equivalent to:  
Α(u) ² infv∈B π*(x,y)(u,v) = Δ*({u}×B)   (Δ3) 
i.e., if A is true (for x =u), B is indeed guaranteed to be possible. By symmetry, (∆1) is equivalent 
to 
   B(v) ≤ infv∈A π*(x,y)(u,v) = infu∈U max(1− Α(u), π*(x,y)(u,v))  (Δ4) 
which corresponds to the proper inference mode from what is guaranteed to be possible (see [26] 
for details). 
- for the implication-based model (negative reading), we have:  
        π(x,y) ≤ (A × Bc)c = Ac + B    (N1) 
which expresses that π*(x,y)(u,v) = 0 if (u,v) ∈ A × Bc,  
and π*(x,y)(u,v) = 1 otherwise (since the other values are not restricted). 
 As expected we have, for all π ≥ π*      
Ν(Ac + B) = 1    (N2) 
Besides (N1) is equivalent to 
Α(u) ²infv∉B1–π*(x,y)(u,v) = Ν*({u}×B)   (N3) 
i.e., if A is true (for x =u), y ∈ B is certain. 
Moreover, (N1) is equivalent to 
supu∈U min(Α(u), π*(x,y)(u,v)) ≤ B(v),   (N4) 
    which is the counterpart of the classical inference: from a state of knowledge including the 
(implicative) representation of the rule, and the one of A is true, one indeed deduces that B is true. 
The inference machinery at work in (N4) is Zadeh’s combination/projection principle [4], or more 
simply here what is also called the compositional rule of inference, together with the entailment 
principle, which are at the basis of his theory of approximate reasoning.  
 
We thus have two possible views of a rule "if A then B" leading to a representation of its epistemic 
contents that associates A and B under the form of either an implicative relation π* which is 
minimally specific, or as a conjunctive relation π* which is maximally specific. It corresponds to a 
bipolar view of a rule [27], the positive side focusing on examples chatacterized by the conjunction 
 7 
of antecedent and consequent and the negative side focusing on counter-examples characterized by 
the complement of the material implication.  
 
Remark. When A and B are fuzzy, (Δ1) and (N1) can be extended in different ways according to the 
choice of the conjunction × ( or of the implication for N1), leading to six types of rules [22], where 
the level cuts of A and B are associated in different ways. Namely, depending on whether the 
implication A → B is modeled by a strong implication (as Dienes’), a residuated implication (as 
Gödel’s), or its contrapositive, we get a certainty rule, a gradual rule, or an impossibility rule. 
Depending on whether, for modeling ×  in A × B, we use a triangular norm (for example the 
minimum), or the right, or the left adjoint of a residuated implication, we get a (guaranteed) 
possibility rule, or two types of “anti-gradual” rules. More details in [22, 25]. 
 
4.2 A second dichotomy : rules vs. meta-rules 
 
As already said, in the previous approach, in the case where the possibility distributions are viewed 
as restrictions on possible values [2], the inference is governed by the combination / projection 
principle [4] as is clear in (N4). However, some works have considered the inference process 
directly at the meta level by directly specifying πy as soon as the condition part of the rule is 
satisfied. This idea has been studied in particular by Esteva et al. [28] (see also [22]); it also 
underlies the “compatibility-modification inference” proposed by Cross and Sudkamp [29]. 
 
Apart from the bipolar relational view of an if-then rule just recalled, we may indeed see the rule "if 
x is A then y is B" as the specification of a link between constraints on the possibility distributions 
πx and πy which describe states of knowledge about the quantities x and y respectively [22]. Rules 
of this latter type are called meta-rules, as they encode relationships between different epistemic 
states, at the meta-level, rather than relationships between possible values, at the object level. Each 
of the two components of the rule may be then interpreted as, for instance, πx ≤ A and πy ≤ B (by 
modeling ‘x is A’ and ‘y is B’ by restrictions on the possible values of x and y). This leads to see 
the rule as a crisp‘production’ rule of the form 
if πx ≤ A then πy ≤ B   (NN1) 
which can also be interpreted in terms of necessity measures, as: 
 
if Nx(A) = 1 then Ny(B) = 1  (NN2) 
 
i.e., “if A is certain then B is certain”, where Nx and Ny are necessity measures associated to the 
possibility distributions πx and πy respectively.  
 
Obviously, the statement "if x is A then y is B" understood in this way is logically equivalent in 
classical logic to "not(x is A) or y is B", i.e.,  
 
not(πx ≤ A) or πy ≤ B. 
 
A second type of meta-rules results from the observation that, apart from not(πx ≤ A) understood as 
∃u πx(u) > A(u), there exists another interpretation of negation that corresponds to πx ≤ 1 – A. 
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Then if we consider the statement "(x is Ac) or y is B", i.e., πx ≤ 1 − A or πy ≤ B, one sees that it 
may be rewritten under the form  
 
if not(πx ≤ Ac) then πy ≤ B 
The latter, when A and B are ordinary subsets, may be read in terms of a Boolean possibility 
measure, since then not(πx ≤ Ac) ⇔ not(Nx(Ac) = 1) ⇔Nx(Ac) = 0 ⇔ Πx(A) = 1. 
This gives birth to a new kind of rule of the form 
 
if Πx(A) = 1 then Ny(B) = 1  (ΠN1) 
 
i.e.,“if A is possible then B is certain”. 
 
Note that since πx, y ≤ πx ≤ 1 – A or πx, y ≤ πy ≤ B3 entails πx, y ≤ max(1 – A, B), (ΠN1) is stronger 
than (N1), and since πx ≤ 1 – A entails not(πx ≤ A), assuming that πx is normalised, (ΠN1) is also 
stronger than (ΝN1). 
 
In a similar way, two other ‘production’ rules can be defined  
- under the form 
if πx ≥ A then πy ≥ B   (ΔΔ1) 
corresponding to  
if Δx(A) = 1 then Δy(B) = 1  (ΔΔ2) 
i.e., if A is actually possible, B is too; 
- and under the form 
 if ∇x(A) = 1 then Δy(B) = 1  (∇Δ1) 
i.e.,“if some values outside A are impossible then B is guaranteed to be possible”. 
 
5 Rules and meta-rules in possibilistic logic 
 
We now study the counterpart of these rules, in a graded version, in the setting of possibilistic logic. 
We start with a brief reminder on possibilistic logic, a weighted extension of classical logic, where 
the weights are handled using possibility theory. 
 
 
5.1 Possibilistic logic: a short account 
 
A formula in standard possibilistic logic [6, 7] is a pair (p, a) where p is a classical logic 
proposition, and a its level of certainty. It is semantically interpreted under the form of the 
constraint N(p) ≥ a (⇔ Π(¬p) ≤ 1 − a), and is associated to the possibility distribution  
 
π(p, a)(s) = max(<p>(s), 1 − a) 
 
where <p>(s) = 1 if s is a model of p (i.e. an interpretation that makes p true) and <p>(s) = 0 
otherwise (the interpretations that make p false are possible (at most) at degree 1 − a). 
                                                
3 Indeed, by definition, πx(u) = supv πx,y(u, v) ≥ πx,y(u, v), and πy(v) = supu πx,y(u, v) ≥ πx,y(u, v). 
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Inference is based on the cut rule  
 
(¬p ∨ q, a); (p ∨ r, b) |= (q ∨ r, min(a, b)). 
Note that the modus ponens instance of this rule, namely (¬p ∨ q, a); (p, b) |= (q, min(a, b)), is in 
complete agreement with the compositional rule of inference. Namely, it reads semantically 
min(π(p, b)(s), π(¬p ∨ q, a)(s)) ≤ π(q, min(a, b))(s) 
i.e., min(max(<p>(u), 1 − b), max(1 − <p>(u), <q>(u), 1 − a))) ≤ max(<q>(u), 1 − min(a, b)), 
which is an instance of 
supu min(πx(u), πx,y(u,v)) ≤ πy(v) 
with πx representing « x is <p> is b-certain », πx,y representing « (if x is <p> then y is <q>) is a-
certain », and πy representing « y is <q> is min(a, b)-certain ». In the same spirit, in a research note, 
Zadeh [30] has pointed out the parallel between the compositional rule of inference and a 
counterpart of Prolog where expressions are associated with certainty weights equal to 1. See also 
[9] for related discussions. 
 
Besides, there also exists a logic in terms of guaranteed (actual) possibility [8] with formulas of the 
form [p, a], where p is a proposition, and a is its guaranteed possibility level. This corresponds 
semantically to the constraint Δ(p) ≥ a (⇔ ∇(¬p) ≤ 1 − a), and is associated with the possibility 
distribution 
 
π[p, a](u) = min(<p>(u), a). 
 
The corresponding inference is based on the rule 
 
[¬p ∧ q, a]; [p ∧ r, b] |= [q ∧ r, min(a, b)]. 
 
In order to generalize (NN2) for example, one should express that N(p) ≥ a ⇒ N(q) ≥ a. But note 
that even by enforcing a < b in the pair of formulas (p, a), (q, b), possibilistic logic does not enable 
us to express the above implication. One may also enforce the condition N(q) ≥ N(p), which would 
be even stronger than the above implication ⇒. This latter type of information has already been 
considered in [31]. Similarly {[p, a], [q, b]}, with a < b, does not express that Δ(p) ≥ a ⇒ Δ(q) ≥ b. 
We are going to see how such relationships can be expressed in a generalized possibilistic logic. 
  
5.2 Generalized possibilistic logic 
 
We may now consider the counterpart of rules such as (NN2). Formulas in possibilistic logic may 
be linked by only one connective, the conjunction. Indeed the possibilistic logic base {(p,a), (q,b)} 
is equivalent to the conjunction (p, a) ∧ (q, b), which allows us to work in a clausal form. This is 
because N(p) ≥ a ∧ N(q) ≥ b is semantically equivalent to the possibility distribution  
 
π(u) = min(max(<p>(u), 1 − a), max(<q>(u), 1 − b)). 
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in standard possibilistic logic. The formula (p, a) ∨ (q, b), which semantically corresponds to a set 
of two possibility distributions π(p, a) and π(q, b), should be understood at a meta-level with respect to 
one of the two elementary formulas that constitute it. This expresses the disjunctive constraint 
 
N(p) ≥ a or N(q) ≥ b. 
 
In the same way, ¬(p,a) expresses that it is false that N(p) ≥ a and thus N(p) < a. On may thus apply 
classical logic inference at the meta level to such formulas, as already suggested in [32]. 
 
Thus if we have the knowledge base K = {¬(p,a) ∨ (q, a), (p,a)} one can deduce (q, a), which is in 
accordance with the intuition that the epistemic state (q, a) can be produced, once the epistemic 
state (p, a) is established, given the meta-rule ¬(p,a) ∨ (q, a).  
 
It is interesting to observe that while formula (¬p ∨ q, a), enables us to deduce both (q, a) if one has 
(p, a), and (¬p, a) if one has (¬q, a), the meta-formula ¬(p,a) ∨ (q, a) also enables us to get (q, a) 
from (p, a), but does not enable us to deduce (¬p, a) in the presence of (¬q, a). Indeed, (¬q, a) 
expresses that N(¬q) ≥ a, which entails N(q) = 0 if a > 0 (since min(N(q), N(¬q)) = 0 holds). 
Knowing N(q) = 0, along with the rule “N(p) <a or N(q) ≥ a > 0” entails N(p) < a, which differs 
from the stronger conclusion (¬p, a), i.e., N(¬p) ≥ a, that may be obtained from (¬p ∨ q, a) and 
(¬q, a). Moreover N(p) < a, i.e., ¬(p,a) is not a possibilistic logic formula at the object level. This 
shows the deep difference between (¬p ∨ q, a) and ¬(p, a) ∨ (q, a), or between ¬(p, a) and (¬p, a). 
 
In the same way, the counterpart of the meta-rule (ΠN1) writes 
 
if Π(p) ≥ a then N(q) ≥ a, 
 
i.e.,¬〈p, a〉 ∨ (q, a), where a formula of the form 〈p, a〉 encodes the constraint Π(p) ≥ a. A hybrid 
resolution rule [7,8] enables us to reason from such clauses:  
 
(¬p ∨ q, a); 〈p ∨ r, b〉 |= 〈q ∨ r, b〉 if b > 1 − a. 
 
 
If one wants to express, as in logic programming with negation as failure, that 
 
“r is certain provided that p is certain and that one cannot establish q” 
 
it leads to write is as 
 
if N(p) ≥ a and Π(¬q) ≥ b then N(r) ≥ a, 
 
which corresponds to formula ¬(p, a) ∨ ¬〈¬q, b〉 ∨ (r, a). 
 
 Automated reasoning in this setting presupposes to deal with three kinds of information:  
 
- “facts” that are more or less certain, encoded by standard possibilistic logic formulas of the 
form (p, a) where p is a clause and a > 0. 
- possibilistic formulas (q, a) that are “currently impossible to establish” for any a > 0, which 
may be expressed under the form 〈¬q, 1〉, since Π(¬q) = 1 is equivalent to N(q) = 0. Such 
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kinds of statements, that result from a possible lack of information, may also be propagated by 
means of the hybrid resolution rule, once they are acknowledged and expressed. It is clear that 
the arrival of new pieces of information which may enable us to establish new conclusions may 
also lead to delete formulas of the type 〈¬q, 1〉 that were previously accepted. 
- meta-rules of the form ¬(p, a) ∨ (r, a), or more generally ¬(p, a) ∨ ¬〈¬q, 1〉 ∨ (r, a), which 
enable to produce from the two first types of information, positive pieces of information of the 
form (r, a). 
 
This view raises questions on the links between such a generalized possibilistic logic and on the one 
hand, possibilistic logic programming [33, 34], and on the other hand, the logical manipulation of 
epistemic states in modal logic style [35], or with maybe the explicitation of some forms of “(non) 
awareness” [36]. The following and last section discusses the possibilistic logic interpretation of 
classical Answer Set Programming (ASP). 
 
5.3 Answer sets in generalized possibilistic logic 
 
The aim of this section is to summarize how the semantics of answer set programming can be 
described in the generalized possibilistic logic that was introduced above.  Recall that an answer set 
program is a set of rules of the following form: 
 
r ← p1, …, pn, not q1, , …, not qm      (R1) 
 
with the intuitive meaning that whenever p1, …, pn can be established, we may establish r, unless one of q1, …, qm can be established.  Answer sets are consistent sets of literals that can be derived from a set of such rules using non-deterministic forward chaining. The non-determinism results 
from the fact that when applying a rule such as (R1), we need to make the assumption that neither 
of q1, …, qm will be established during the forward chaining procedure. An answer-set of a program P is represented by the set of positive literals A in this model (subset of the so-called Herbrand 
universe H, i.e. the set of all atoms appearing in P). A model of a rule like R1, is then a subset A⊆H 
such that A contains r, all pi’s and no qj’s.  
The rule (R1) corresponds to the following formula in possibilistic logic: 
 
(r, 1) ∨ ¬(p1, 1) ∨ …∨ ¬(pn,1) ∨ ¬〈¬q1, 1〉 ∨ … ∨ ¬〈¬qm, 1〉 (R2)  
In particular, note that a fact of the form « r ← » is translated to the formula (r, 1). For programs P 
without negation-as-failure (i.e. m=0), there is no non-determinism. In such a case, P has exactly 
one answer set A, which is its unique minimal model with respect to inclusion (when interpreting 
the rules in classical logic, using material implication). In such as case, the proposed translation into 
possibilistic logic fully captures the answer set semantics, as is revealed by the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Let P be an answer set program without negation, and let KP be its translation in generalized possibilistic logic, as described above. Let A be the unique answer set of P. It holds that 
p ∈ A iff KP |= (p, 1).  
Proof (sketch). The proof follows straightforwardly from the fact that applying the resolution rule 
to the formulas in KP corresponds to applying forward chaining.   QED 
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The presence of negation-as-failure introduces non-determinism, resulting in the fact that a program 
P may have several answer sets, or none at all. Given a potential answer set A (representing an 
interpretation), checking if it is a model of P comes down to first computing the Gelfond-Lifschitz 
reduct of P with respect to A, denoted PA, and obtained as follows: delete from P all rules trivially 
satisfied by A, that is, rules such that qj ∈ A. Then PA is the set of rules obtained by deleting the 
negative part of the body of all remaining rules. The model A is an answer set of P if A is the 
unique minimal model of PA.  
 
To encode the answer set semantics in possibilistic logic, we will need to consider two sets of 
formulas: the set KP as before and a set of assumptions. Indeed, for programs with negation-as-
failure, we face the problem that the possibilistic logic base KP cannot semantically entail any 
formula of the form 〈¬q, 1〉 with a negative literal, hence the only inferences that can be made are 
based on the translation of rules in which no negation-as-failure occurs. We can now 
add assumptions of the form 〈¬q, 1〉 to KP, meaning that it is consistent to assume ¬q (or more 
precisely, inconsistent to derive q with certainty). The non-determinism of the forward chaining 
procedure is thus translated in the choice of which assumptions of the form 〈¬q, 1〉 to consider. 
Specifically, for B a set of atoms, we define MB = {〈¬q, 1〉q ∈ B}. Then we have the following 
result. 
 
Proposition 2. Let P be an answer set program. It holds that A is an answer set of P iff KP ∪ MH\A is 
consistent and KP ∪ MH\A |= (p, 1) for all p ∈ A. 
 
Proof (sketch). The fact that for an answer set A of P, it holds that KP ∪ MH\A is consistent, follows 
easily from the fact that KPA ∪ MH\A is consistent, which in turn follows from Proposition 1 (with PA 
the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct of P).  Similarly, KP ∪ MH\A |= (p, 1) follows from the observation that 
KPA ∪ MH\A |= (p, 1) due to Proposition 1. Conversely, if KP ∪ MH\A is consistent and KP ∪ MH\A |= 
(p, 1) for all p ∈ A, we need to show that A is the answer set of the reduct PA. By observing that the 
only inconsistencies that may exist between disjuncts of KPA and formulas of MH\A are between 
formulas of the form (q,1) and 〈¬q, 1〉, it is easy to show that the answer set A* of PA should be such 
that A ⊆ A*, using Proposition 1 and the assumption that KP ∪ MH\A |= (p, 1) for all p ∈ A. From the 
assumption that KP ∪ MH\A is consistent, we moreover find that A*⊆ A. 
     QED 
 
Note that the condition that KP ∪ MH\A|= (p, 1) can alternatively be written as "KP ∪ MH\(A\{p}) is 
inconsistent for all p ∈ A". In other words, answer sets correspond to maximal sets of assumptions 
of the form 〈¬q, 1〉 consistent with KP. 
 
In the weighted case, note that, for any possibilistic logic base K we either have K |= 〈q, a〉 or K |= 
(¬q, b) for some b > 1 − a, as 〈q, a〉 corresponds to the constraint Π(q) ≥ a while (¬q, b) 
corresponds to Π(q) ≤ 1−b. This means that, under the minimal specificity semantics, adding 
formulas of the form 〈q, a〉 is either redundant at the semantic level or makes the resulting 
possibilistic logic base inconsistent. This suggests to read 〈q, a〉 as "it is consistent to assume that 
q is possible (to degree a)". Hence, we could look at formulas of the form (p, a) as expressing 
knowledge, and at formulas of the form 〈q, a〉 as expressing constraints on what may be 
derived. Now, assume that K is a standard possibilistic logic base and that K ∪ {〈q, a〉} is 
consistent, then K and K ∪ {〈q, a〉} are semantically equivalent in the sense that they induce the 
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same possibility distribution. When we consider an expression of the form (p, a) ∨ ¬〈q, a〉, 
however, the picture changes. In particular, the following two bases will typically not be equivalent 
anymore (provided that (q, a) is not a standard possibilistic consequence of K): 
 
K’ = K ∪ {(p, a) ∨ ¬〈q, a〉} 
K’’ = K ∪ {〈q, a〉} ∪ {(p, a) ∨ ¬〈q, a〉} 
 
In particular, note that {〈q, a〉} ∪ {(p, a) ∨ ¬〈q, a〉} |= (p, a). If (p, a) ∪ K |= (¬q, b) for some 
weight b > 1 − a, we thus find that K’’ is inconsistent, whereas K’ may not be.  
 
This apparent paradox can be solved using a semantics in terms of families of possibility 
distributions. Define π |= (p, a) if and only if N(p) ≥ a, and π |= 〈p, a〉 if and only if Π(p) ≥ a. Rather 
than identifying a possibilistic knowledge base with a single possibility distribution, being the least 
specific possibility distribution satisfying the imposed constraints, we may also identify a 
possibilistic knowledge base with the set of all possibility distributions that satisfy these constraints. 
In other words, we use meta-models [32, 35] consisting of sets of possibility distributions satisfying 
possibilistic formulas. Under this extended semantics, it is clear that the set of meta-models of K 
and the one of K ∪ {〈q, a〉} are generally different. In other words the above discussion suggests 
that: 
- Generalizing possibilistic logic with more connectives and modalities requires moving from 
weighted rules to meta-rules at the syntactic level (where formulas relate belief states, rather 
than only restricting possible worlds), and moving from a fuzzy set of models (a single 
possibility distribution) to a set of fuzzy meta-models, at the semantic level.  
- This seems to be the only way to go in order to capture and extend answer set programming in 
the setting of possibility theory.  
 
6  Conclusion  
 
The article has sketched an overview of the different forms of if-then rules that can be expressed in 
the framework of possibility theory, emphasizing the difference between the rules that contribute to 
specify an epistemic state, and the meta-rules that go from a partial epistemic state to another partial 
epistemic state. This distinction has enabled us to bridge a generalization of possibilistic logic with 
possibilistic answer set programming. It is also worth pointing out that the meta-rules that are based 
on guaranted possibility, suggested in this article for the first time, are still to be studied for a better 
understanding of their potential interest. Besides, the idea of processing approximate reasoning at a 
symbolic level [37], in agreement with the idea of computing with words [38], might be revisited in 
terms of meta-rules. 
 
Remarkably enough, the theory of approximate reasoning and possibility theory are not among 
Zadeh's most cited contributions nowadays. This is due to the tremendous success of fuzzy 
controllers and the subsequent association between fuzzy rules and neural networks, which 
popularized fuzzy systems in the area of numerical information processing. This trend, which in 
some sense questions the linguistic expert-driven stance of Zadeh’s pioneering works, has also cast 
some suspicion on the relevance of symbolic artificial intelligence, whose approach was presented 
as being at odds with fuzzy logic at large. But, from the beginning, Mamdani used to see fuzzy 
control as an application of Artificial Intelligence. Moreover, Zadeh’s approximate reasoning 
theory, totally neglected by the neuro-fuzzy tradition, is a fuzzy version of logic-based AI 
(possibilistic logic is a particular case of it), and basic axioms of possibility theory turn out to lie at 
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the core of a major approach to non-monotonic reasoning [10, 11, 12]. These facts demonstrate that 
the contributions of Zadeh pioneered important works quite outside the fuzzy community (whether 
their tenants admit it or not). This short paper suggests a new bridge between possibility theory and 
one of the most popular approaches in symbolic AI to-date, answer-set programming. This bridge is 
also related to pioneering texts of Zadeh concerning “possibility-qualification” of linguistic 
statements [3], thus indicating that after 45 years of fuzzy logic, some contributions by its founder 
that are currently often neglected have a good chance to be rediscovered.  
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